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Point and Click to  
Protect Public Health 
TAKING CHARGE OF INFORMATION 
DISSEMINATION OVER THE INTERNET 
DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 
INTRODUCTION  
Modern information technology enables our nation to 
respond to public health emergencies in unprecedented ways.1 
Information dissemination is no longer limited to newspapers, 
books, and word of mouth. Instead, the Internet has become an 
overwhelmingly popular venue for the rapid spread of infor-
mation and sharing of ideas.2 But while the Internet has 
undoubtedly benefited society, it may hinder our nation’s 
ability to respond effectively to public health emergencies.3 
Individual users can obtain and share information about health 
and news alerts quickly,4 but such online sources are not 
  
 1 The United States suffered from several public health emergencies in the 
first half of the twentieth century, such as tuberculosis, yellow fever, and smallpox. 
KENNETH R. WING ET AL., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 10, 16 (2007); Wendy K. Mariner et al., 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health 
Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 582 (2005). At the time, vaccines were largely 
unavailable and hospitals were not the modern institutions we know today. Id. at 582. 
As recently as the 1960s, public attention and response to health risks were often 
delayed. For example, outcry against the use of DDT reached its peak only after 
publication of a book: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. WING ET AL., supra, at 17. In the 
new millennium, the Internet provides a speedy way to share information. MARK 
SABLEMAN, MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS: COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
236 (1997) (“Computer linkups such as electronic mail and the Internet allow parties to 
communicate easily and practically instantly with persons who are far away.”). 
 2 JOHN B. HORRIGAN, ONLINE NEWS 1, 10 (2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/PIP_News.and.Broadband.pdf (noting that thirty-five percent of adults who use 
the Internet turn to websites, including blogs, for news each day). 
 3 Public health emergencies include “emergencies created by contagious 
disease, whether through an act of bioterror or a widespread, naturally-occurring 
epidemic.” WING ET AL., supra note 1, at 234. For an example of how modern 
communication technology interferes with responses to public health emergencies, see 
infra Part II.C.  
 4 See SUSANNAH FOX, ONLINE HEALTH SEARCH 2006 1, 9, http:// 
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Online_Health_2006.pdf (finding that eighty percent  
of Americans used the Internet to find information about health issues and fifty-one 
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always reliable.5 Information disseminated over the Internet is 
not always accurate and sometimes creates panic or confusion 
among lay citizens during public health emergencies.6 Chaos 
and confusion among members of the general public can 
impede the success of local and national response plans. 
Commentators as well as state and federal agencies 
have recognized that our nation’s public health laws are 
outdated.7 However, recent efforts to modernize state and 
federal emergency response plans have neglected to account for 
the impact that the Internet may have during a public health 
emergency.8 Specifically, communication over the Internet may 
cause the public to receive conflicting information and lead to 
panic. This Note will argue that current public health 
emergency response plans should be amended both to address 
the Internet’s role during a public health emergency and to 
minimize the impact of individual Internet users’ influence on 
the public’s perception of a public health emergency. Part I will 
evaluate current state and federal emergency response plans 
that include provisions for communicating health threats to the 
general public. Part II will examine the nature and reliability 
of information exchanged in the Internet community. Part II 
will also explore instances when the Internet further weakened 
already poor responses to public health emergencies. Finally, 
Part III will suggest steps authorities should take through 
  
percent of users wanted to share the information they obtained); HORRIGAN, supra note 
2, at 8 (observing that less experienced users rely on information obtained by more 
advanced users). 
 5 See infra Part II.B. 
 6 See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the Internet’s role immediately after 
the 2001 anthrax attacks. 
 7 Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 119 (2005) (“[T]he bulk of states’ public health 
law is forty to one hundred years old and does not reflect modern legal norms or 
contemporary mechanisms of disease prevision and control.”). One reason to dedicate 
time to drafting a proper emergency response plan is that Congress, especially after 
disasters such as hurricane Katrina in 2004, desires specific plans for how the 
administration will respond to emergencies. Hillary R. Ahle, Anticipating Pandemic 
Avian Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans Are for the Birds, 10 
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 213, 217 (2007); Gardiner Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak 
Rattles Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at A23 (quoting Senator Tom Harkin’s 
comment that Congress wanted “specific goals and procedures . . . to take to prepare for 
this”). Another motivation behind revising public health emergency response plans is 
to better prepare the nation for a bioterrorist attack, which could have a serious impact 
on both public health and the economy. See Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism 
Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties 
Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1127-28 (2003) (contending that bioterrorism poses a 
very real and significant threat to our nation). 
 8 See infra Part I. 
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legislation to improve the dissemination of accurate and trust-
worthy information over the Internet. 
I.  CURRENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS 
Congress and state legislatures have attempted to 
improve plans that govern responses to public health emer-
gencies in recent years. After the confusion that ensued from 
the 2001 anthrax scare, the Centers for Disease Control 
(“CDC”) quickly completed the Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act (“MSEHPA”).9 On the federal level, one of the 
emergency response plans proposed shortly after the anthrax 
incident was the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.10 While updated 
legislation in this area is certainly needed, these plans fail to 
consider that advanced information technology requires society 
to adapt emergency response protocols to a new communication 
era. 
A. State Level: Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
In October 2001, the CDC commissioned the George-
town Center for Law and the Public’s Health to construct  
a model act that would guide local health authorities in 
formulating a plan for responding to public health emergen-
cies.11 One impetus for revamping state response plans was a 
  
 9 Brown, supra note 7, at 96. For an account of the public response to the 
anthrax attacks, see infra Part II.C. 
 10 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); Ryan R. Kemper, Note, Responding 
to Bioterrorism: An Analysis of Titles I and II of the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 385, 404 (2005). 
 11 JAMES G. HODGE JR. & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, THE MODEL STATE 
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT—A BRIEF COMMENTARY 3, 7, 9 (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/Center%20MSEHPA%20Commentary.pdf. 
As defined by the MSEHPA, 
[a] “public health emergency” is an occurrence or imminent threat of an 
illness or health condition that: (1) is believed to be caused by any of the 
following: (i) bioterrorism; (ii) the appearance of a novel or previously 
controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; (iii) [a natural 
disaster;] (iv) [a chemical attack or accidental release; or] (v) [a nuclear attack 
or accident]; and (2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms: (i) 
a large number of deaths in the affected population; (ii) a large number of 
serious or long-term disabilities in the affected population; or (iii) widespread 
exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of 
substantial future harm to a large number of people in the affected 
population.  
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concern that public health emergency regulations infringed on 
individuals’ freedoms, a concern that has blossomed over the 
past century.12 Indeed, states have become more conscientious 
in providing due process when engaging in activities of public 
health management, such as surveillance, vaccination, and 
quarantine.13  
The other motivation behind the MSEHPA was the U.S. 
response to the anthrax attacks. After the 2001 anthrax scare 
demonstrated weaknesses in the country’s ability to respond to 
a bioterrorist attack,14 the CDC became anxious to have the 
model act completed.15 The Georgetown Center completed its 
draft in December 2001.16 As of July 15, 2006, forty-four states 
and the District of Columbia had introduced a version of the 
MSEHPA.17 
The MSEHPA’s drafters focused on granting authority 
to local public health agencies that would help local auth- 
orities prevent, detect, manage, and control public health 
  
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 104(m) (Ctr. for L. & the Pub. 
Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs., Draft, Dec. 21, 2001), available at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. 
 12 HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 11, at 10 (“Existing public health laws may 
pre-date vast changes in constitutional and statutory law that have altered social and 
legal conceptions of individual rights. Contemporary standards of equal protection and 
due process in constitutional law and of disability discrimination, privacy, and civil 
rights in statutory law must be reflected in public health law.”); see also Mariner et al., 
supra note 1, at 581 (“Preserving the public’s health in the 21st century requires 
preserving respect for personal liberty.”); Leah Z. Ziskin & Drew A. Harris, State 
Health Policy for Terrorism Preparedness, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1583, 1584 (2007) 
(“States had concerns that their ability to respond effectively to public health 
emergencies might be hampered because their older statutes did not reflect current 
thinking about individual rights and privacy and were not applicable to modern 
healthcare delivery systems.”). 
 13 Ziskin & Harris, supra note 12, at 1585. Federal and state statutes restrict 
the amount of time individuals may be quarantined without a court order and provide 
opportunities for quarantined individuals to have hearings. For example, New York 
City grants individuals who are suspected of carrying a communicable disease the right 
to a hearing and requires a court order authorizing detention for more than sixty days. 
24 RCNY § 11.55(a), (f) (Supp. 2007); see also Mariner et al., supra note 1, at 586 
(noting that segregating individuals suspected of being infected requires substantial 
justification today). 
 14 See infra Part II.C for a description of the nation’s response to the 2001 
anthrax incident. 
 15 Brown, supra note 7, at 96. 
 16 HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 11, at 9. 
 17 See The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown & Johns 
Hopkins Universities, Model State Public Health Laws, http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ 
Resources/Modellaws.htm#MSEHPA (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
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emergencies.18 The MSEHPA aims to improve communication 
during a public health emergency (1) between authorities so 
that appropriate bodies are notified once a potential outbreak 
has occurred and (2) between authorities and the public so that 
the public understands how to protect itself and how local 
agencies are handling the emergency.19 However, the MSEHPA 
fails to provide a detailed communication plan. Specifically, the 
provisions for sharing information about a public health 
emergency fail to mention the Internet as a medium of 
communication. Moreover, the model act’s article that dictates 
how the authorities will notify the public of a public health 
emergency lacks guidelines for responding to the counterpro-
ductive effects of rapidly spread rumors and false information, 
which are likely to occur in an age of advanced communication 
technology.20  
The MSEHPA contains several provisions that set forth 
specific instructions for communicating information about a 
public health emergency,21 indicating that the drafters 
recognized the importance of facilitating communication during 
a public health emergency. For example, Article III includes 
instructions pertaining to the nature of the information that 
must be exchanged between authorities.22 In addition, the 
MSEHPA provides that only necessary information must be 
shared,23 suggesting that the drafters recognized an interest in 
protecting information. Further evidence that the MSEHPA 
drafters were concerned about the control of communication 
  
 18 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT pmbl., at 6 (Ctr. for L. & 
the Pub. Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs., Draft, Dec. 21, 2001), 
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.  
 19 Id. §§ 303, 701. 
 20 Id. art. VII. 
 21 Id. §§ 303, 401, 403(b). 
 22 Id. § 303(a), (b). The MSEHPA requires the public safety authority to 
notify the public health authority when it receives information about an illness, health 
condition, or suspicious event. Id. § 303(a). It requires the public health authority to 
notify the public safety authority when it becomes aware of an illness or health 
condition that may be related to bioterrorism. Id. § 303(b). As defined by the MSEHPA, 
a “ ‘[p]ublic safety authority’ means . . . any local government agency that acts 
principally to protect or preserve the public safety; or any person directly authorized to 
act on behalf of the . . . local agency.” Id. § 104(n). As defined by the MSEHPA, a 
“ ‘[p]ublic health authority’ is . . . any local government agency that acts principally to 
protect or preserve the public’s health; or any person directly authorized to act on 
behalf of the . . . local public health agency.” Id. § 104(l). 
 23 Id. § 303(c) (“Sharing of information on reportable illnesses, health 
conditions, unusual clusters, or suspicious events between public health and safety 
authorities shall be restricted to the information necessary for the treatment, control, 
investigation, and prevention of a public health emergency.”). 
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appears in Article IV, which grants the public health authority 
the power to “[o]rganiz[e] public information activities” after 
the declaration of a public health emergency.24 This fairly broad 
grant of authority leaves substantial discretion to the public 
health authority to determine how information will be shared 
with the public. However, none of these provisions mention the 
Internet or advise the public health authority to use modern 
technology to assist in the response to a public health 
emergency. 
Article VII, which addresses communicating the nature 
of emergencies to the public, would be the article most likely to 
contain directions about communicating over the Internet.25 
Article VII requires the public health authority to inform the 
public that a public health emergency has been declared, how 
individuals can protect themselves, and what steps authorities 
are taking to address the situation.26 The article also provides 
guidance for communicating with disabled individuals and non-
English-speaking members of the public,27 which suggests that 
the drafters intended to provide for widespread and effective 
communication. However, Article VII lacks specific guidelines 
for controlling the dissemination of information to the public. It 
fails to provide a specific method for informing the public of an 
emergency and instead broadly directs authorities to use “all 
available and reasonable means calculated to bring the 
information promptly to the attention of the general public.”28 
It also ignores the possibility that the public may hear about 
the emergency declaration from another source prior to the 
public health authority’s efforts to communicate information 
about the emergency. This lack of control and specificity may 
prove problematic when authorities are required to respond 
rapidly and must decide what information to disclose, when to 
disclose it, and to whom it should be disclosed.29  
Although the MSEHPA lacks specific guidelines for 
communicating to the public, the model act’s drafters 
  
 24 Id. § 403(b).  
 25 See id. art. VII.  
 26 Id. § 701. For a definition of “public health authority,” see supra note 22. 
 27 Id. § 701(b), (c). 
 28 Id. § 701(a). 
 29 Elisabeth Belmont et al., Emergency Preparedness, Response & Recovery 
Checklist: Beyond the Emergency Management Plan, 37 J. HEALTH L. 503, 514 (2004) 
(identifying such information as important for an emergency communication plan). 
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acknowledged that the MSEHPA is not all-inclusive.30 Perhaps 
in recognition of its limited coverage, the MSEHPA leaves room 
for expanding the public health authority’s duties.31 For 
example, the MSEHPA allows the governor to appoint a Public 
Health Emergency Planning Commission,32 which would be 
responsible for delivering to the governor a public emergency 
response plan that may include guidelines for notifying the 
public and “[o]ther measures necessary to carry out the 
purposes of this Act.”33 The use of the words “other measures 
necessary” suggests that the MSEHPA leaves room for further 
regulation of communication to the public. 
B.  Federal Level: Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Act of 2002 
The federal government also recognized the need for a 
revised national response plan after the 2001 anthrax attacks, 
which left healthcare workers misinformed, members of the 
public panicked, and everyone confused about the seriousness 
of the outbreak.34 The nation’s shaky response moved Congress 
to enact the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Pre-
paredness Act of 2002.35 The Act attempts to strengthen the 
federal government’s response to a bioterrorist attack.36 It sets 
“preparedness goals” that aim to assist state and local 
governments in planning how to respond to an attack.37 In 
  
 30 For example, the MSEHPA omits certain areas of law, such as regulation 
of health care. HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 11, at 36. 
 31 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 202(a). 
 32 Id. § 201. 
 33 Id. § 202(a). 
 34 Caron Chess & Lee Clarke, Facilitation of Risk Communication During the 
Anthrax Attacks of 2001: The Organizational Backstory, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1578, 
1578, 1580 (2007). 
 35 Kemper, supra note 10, at 403. 
 36 Some commentators claim that the threat of a bioterrorist attack has been 
blown out of proportion and that we are wasting valuable resources trying to combat an 
event that is unlikely to occur. George J. Annas, The Statute of Security: Human Rights 
and Post-9/11 Epidemics, 38 J. HEALTH L. 319, 327-29 (2005). However, Japan, Iraq, 
and the former Soviet Union have all had biological weapons programs, and Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria are suspected of having such programs. Gostin, supra note 7, 
at 1119. Additional reasons to develop response strategies in the event of a bioterrorist 
attack include the fact that biological weapons are easy and relatively inexpensive to 
develop, anthrax has been used against our nation in the past decade, and drills testing 
our emergency procedures have demonstrated significant weaknesses in our nation’s 
preparedness. Id. at 1112-13.  
 37 Kemper, supra note 10, at 404 (citing Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 101(b), 
116 Stat. 594, 597 (2002)). 
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addition, the Act establishes the office of Assistant Secretary 
for Public Health and Emergency Preparedness under the 
Department of Health and Human Services to control the 
Department’s response mechanisms.38  
The Act also contains a number of provisions that focus 
on improving communications.39 For example, it grants the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to use  
the Health Alert Network (“HAN”) as the main system of com-
munication and surveillance40 and to establish an Emergency 
Public Information and Communications Advisory Committee, 
a body charged with recommending ways to communicate a 
public health emergency to the public.41  
The extent to which the Act provides specific guidelines 
for communicating to the public during an emergency is limited 
to designating the responsibility for developing a plan to the 
Secretary and recommending the creation of a federal website 
for bioterrorism.42 The purpose of the federal website would be 
to inform the public and specific interest groups, such as 
medical workers, about bioterrorism.43 The website would also 
provide links to the websites of state and local authorities.44 
However, the Act does not provide guidance for conveying the 
authority or reliability of such a website,45 although such 
information would assist Internet users in distinguishing the 
official website from other websites that may simultaneously 
  
 38 Id. at 406. 
 39 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 104 (b)-(d), 116 Stat. 594, 605-06 (2002). 
 40 Kemper, supra note 10, at 408. The HAN disseminates information 
concerning disease data and surveillance, treatment suggestions, and health alerts via 
high-speed Internet to state and local officials. Id. at 395-96. The HAN is concerned 
with informing health departments and providers rather than the general public. 
LINDA YOUNG LANDESMAN, PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS: THE 
PRACTICE GUIDE 148 (2d ed. 2005). 
 41 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 
§ 104(b)(3)(B), 116 Stat. at 605-06 (“The EPIC Advisory Committee shall make 
recommendations to the Secretary and the working group under subsection (a) and 
report on appropriate ways to communicate public health information regarding 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies to the public.”). The committee was 
to terminate one year following enactment of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. Id. 
§ 104(b)(3)(E), 116 Stat. at 606. 
 42 Id. § 104(c), (d), 116 Stat. at 606. 
 43 Id. § 104(b)(3), 116 Stat. at 606. 
 44 Id. § 104(d), 116 Stat. at 606. 
 45 Id. § 104(d), 116 Stat. at 606. 
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provide information about a particular biological agent or about 
the risks associated with a particular disease or vaccination.46  
The MSEHPA and the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act 
demonstrate that although lawmakers are contemplating 
methods of communication during public health emergencies, 
they have failed to acknowledge the Internet as an over-
whelmingly popular channel of information. The Internet’s 
prominent role in the sharing of information makes it 
imperative for future legislation to account for the impact of 
cyberspace communications.47 
II. INFORMATION DISSEMINATED VIA THE INTERNET 
The Internet’s capacity for rapid communication enables 
the public to become informed of an event much more quickly 
than in the past. But speed alone is insufficient to improve 
responses to emergencies in today’s Internet-dominated world. 
The information conveyed about emergencies must also be 
accurate so that the public can appropriately assess and 
respond to the risks.48 If the information transmitted over the 
Internet is not properly monitored, the Internet can augment 
panic or cause confusion by disseminating inaccurate or 
incomplete information to an overwhelmingly large audience.49  
A. Whose News Are Users Receiving? 
A significant number of Americans now turn to the 
Internet for their daily news.50 In particular, there is a surge in 
Internet usage for news after major events.51 Many Internet 
users choose to receive alerts from websites about breaking 
  
 46 See infra Part II.C, discussing false information found online about 
anthrax treatment. 
  47  See infra Part II. 
 48 Cynthia P. Schneider & Michael D. McDonald, Part III: National 
Challenges in Population Health: “The King of Terrors” Revisited: The Smallpox 
Vaccination Campaign and its Lessons for Future Biopreparedness, 31 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 580, 587 (2003). 
 49 See supra Part II.C. 
 50 HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 1 (finding that “35% of adult internet users, or 
about 50 million adults, check the news online on the typical day” and that “[a]fter 
email and going online to conduct a search, news is the third most popular online 
activity on the average day”). “For broadband internet users, online news is a more 
regular part of the daily news diet than is the local paper; it is nearly as much of a 
daily habit as is getting news from national TV newscasts and radio.” Id. at i. 
 51 Id. at 3 (“[M]ajor news events create spikes in online news consumption.”). 
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news and headlines.52 At times, the Internet is the only way 
that information about a particular event can be globally 
transmitted,53 and it is often more accessible than many other 
media sources.54 
Compared to traditional news media forms such as 
newspapers and television programs, the Internet allows 
individual users to play a more significant role in how infor-
mation is conveyed.55 Although reputable online news sources 
dominate the sharing of information over the Internet,56 
individual users, through alterable media outlets such as 
message boards, also impact how information is selected and 
relayed online.57 Unlike the telephone, which allows for quick 
communication but is usually limited to one-on-one conver-
sations between people who know each other, the Internet 
allows a multitude of strangers to exchange information and 
ideas concerning news.58 Communities in which users share 
videos, opinions, and information through cyberspace have 
grown overwhelmingly popular.59 Active Internet users often 
  
 52 Id. at 16 (finding that users who elect to receive news alerts from websites 
want information about headlines or breaking news). 
 53 See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Monks’ Protest Is Challenging Burmese Junta, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at A1 (describing how photographs, videos, and audio files of 
protests were communicated over the Internet after Myanmar’s government prohibited 
foreign journalists from entering the country). 
 54 For example, users can connect to the Internet through their cell phones. 
David A. Kelly, Tools for Travelers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at H2 (“Most  
mobile phones offer Internet access and Web browsers.”); see also http:// 
www.getreadygear.com/pdfdocs/Telephone%20Tips%20to%20Support%20Your%20Eme
rgency%20Communications%20Plan.pdf (recommending the use of a wireless phone to 
obtain weather information via the Internet during an emergency). 
 55 HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
 56 Id. at iv (“46% of all internet users say they go to the website of a national 
TV news organization such as CNN or MSNBC . . . .”). 
 57 Id. at 8-9; see also SABLEMAN, supra note 1, at 239 (“A message or bulletin-
board posting can be updated or changed many times after its first publication and 
hence be viewed by many different readers with many different contents.”). 
 58 HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that some people rely on “elite 
broadband users,” or “users with the closest relationship with the internet,” to obtain 
information). These elite users influence the selection of information made available 
online. Id. at 8-9.  
 59 Lev Grossman, Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006. In 2006, Time 
magazine named its person of the year “You,” emphasizing the explosion of Internet 
outlets such as YouTube, Facebook, and Wikipedia. Id. In addition, the blogging 
phenomenon has grown exponentially and given voice to reviewers, commentators, and 
skeptics who may otherwise have remained silent or lacked the publicity needed to 
have any impact. (For a definition of “blog,” see infra note 61.) See, e.g., Neva Chonin, 
LiveJournal Grew Out of One 18-year-old’s Frustration with Web Journaling, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 27, 2005, at E1 (describing the “burgeoning universe known as the 
blogosphere”); Greg Sandoval, Peas in a Podcast, MIAMI HERALD, July 19, 2005, at 8C 
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become “opinion leaders,” serving as a source of news to other 
people and shaping the market for information online.60 These 
active news consumers occasionally obtain information from 
non-traditional websites, such as blogs or listservs.61 In sum, 
news disseminated over the Internet is subject to more 
individualized control than news disseminated through other 
channels. Such individualized control over information com-
municated to the public has the potential to cause chaos in the 
aftermath of a public health emergency.62  
Besides giving individuals greater influence on news 
content, the Internet threatens stability during and after a 
public health emergency by providing a virtually unlimited 
landscape for individuals to express themselves.63 Many people 
engage in political speech over the Internet to provoke public 
response and communicate political views about particular 
events.64 Since public cooperation is crucial to the success of a 
  
(“The runaway popularity of blogging . . . has turned everyday people into online news 
outlets.”). 
 60 HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 8-9 (“[O]pinion leaders . . . [are] elite broad-
band users [who] are likely to be people others rely upon when gathering information 
of various sorts.”). 
 61 Id. at iv, 13 (“Though the news sites of established media organizations 
dominate among the broadband elite for daily news, it is notable that a sizeable share 
of elite broadband users turn to non-traditional sites at about the same rate all 
internet users did for general news in the internet’s prehistoric days.”).  
  A blog, or weblog, is “a Web site on which an individual or group of users 
produces an ongoing narrative.” THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 179, 1903 
(2d ed. 2005). A listserv is “an electronic mailing list of people who wish to receive 
specified information from the Internet.” Id. at 989.  
 62 Shifting focus from the group to the individual weakens society’s ability to 
effectively respond to public health emergencies. Wendy E. Parmet, Unprepared: Why 
Health Law Fails to Prepare Us for a Pandemic, 2 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 157, 178 
(2006) (demonstrating that in the context of the flu vaccine market, individuals make 
decisions based upon their individual interests, which ultimately weakens society’s 
ability to respond to surge demands in the event of an epidemic).  
 63 “[T]he Internet provides an easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to 
reach a large audience, potentially of millions.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 
F. Supp. 824, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1996). During the SARS outbreak, individuals used the 
Internet and other modern channels of communication to spread news during a health 
emergency. Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censorship of the 
Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 582 
(2007). Chinese citizens’ command of the information fortunately aided rather than 
impeded the response to the outbreak. Id. at 582, 595. But some individuals may refuse 
to accept that an emergency exists or will argue against any compromise of individual 
liberties. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 7, at 1140 (“[T]he journals, newspapers, and 
Internet are replete with claims that no legal authority should exist to vaccinate, treat, 
and quarantine individuals or to abate nuisances, seize property, or take property for 
public uses.”). 
 64 See, e.g., Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (plaintiff 
posted a controversial video about a military takeover in New York City on a website); 
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 
 
1602 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:4 
response to a public health emergency,65 officials must be aware 
of individuals who may cast doubt on either the nature of the 
threat or the government’s ability to effectively respond to the 
situation. In the event such individuals interfere with com-
munication of accurate information to the public, officials must 
be prepared to correct any misleading information and clarify 
the nature of the emergency.66 
B. Online Health Information: How Reliable Is It? 
The Internet’s ability to allow people to share informa-
tion has certainly benefited modern society by increasing 
efficiency.67 But unclear or incorrect information can be danger-
ous because many users rely heavily on health information 
they find online,68 despite the fact that such information is not 
always accurate or up to date.69  
The Internet makes an abundance of health information 
freely available.70 A recent study revealed that most Internet 
  
290 F.3d 1058, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002) (anti-abortion organization posted names and 
addresses of abortion providers on a website intended to rally support for its cause); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (student 
crafted an online parody profile of his school principal); Pilchesky v. Miller, No. 3-CV-
05-2074, 2006 WL 2884445 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2006) (website administrators managed 
a message board where users were invited to comment on a local government 
employee). There was even a website responding to the drafting of MSEHPA, 
criticizing the model act for infringing upon individual liberties. Jason Mercier, 
Emergency Health Powers Act Threatens Liberty, Jan. 2, 2002, http://www.effwa.org/ 
opeds/2002_01_02.php (referring to MSEHPA as “an unacceptable threat to freedom”).  
 65 See Gostin, supra note 7, at 1166 (discussing the importance of community 
cooperation when working with the government to take protective actions). 
 66 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 67 See Amy Keane, Annotation, Validity of State Statutes and Administrative 
Regulations Regulating Internet Communications Under Commerce Clause and First 
Amendment of Federal Constitution, 98 A.L.R.5th 167, § 2(a) (2002) (noting that the 
Internet connects individuals and provides methods “for free exchange of information 
and ideas”). 
 68 FOX, supra note 4, at 13 (“Another factor in the eroding attention to 
information quality indicators is the sense of confidence and efficacy prevalent among 
most internet users.”). Most people using the Internet to find health information were 
confident in the quality of the information they found. Id. at 13. But some 
commentators would advise them to be more conscientious. See Sean B. Hoar, Trends 
in Cybercrime: The Dark Side of the Internet, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2005) (“The growth of 
the Internet has been accompanied by an increase in newly detected system 
‘vulnerabilities’—insecure areas that may threaten the security of a computer 
system.”).  
 69 See Tamar Lewin, Anthrax Drug Sold Online Leads to Suit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2002, at A9; see also FOX, supra note 4, at 11-12. 
 70 See FOX, supra note 4, at 4 (finding that users turned to the Internet for 
information on diverse health issues, including specific diseases, nutrition, and 
environmental health hazards); see also Audiey C. Kao & Erica Ozanne Linden, Direct 
to Consumer Advertising and the Internet: Informational Privacy, Product Liability and 
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users in the United States have looked for health information 
online, including information about diseases, vaccinations, and 
environmental hazards.71 In addition, the information users 
obtained online influenced the actions they took with regard  
to their health.72 Although the information was sometimes 
confusing or overwhelming,73 only one-third of users surveyed 
who obtained health information online consulted a doctor 
about the information they found.74 Perhaps most importantly, 
the study showed that people who researched health issues 
online were largely unconcerned about the quality and 
accuracy of the information displayed on websites.75 Instead, 
users displayed a deep confidence in what they read online.76  
This confidence is not always warranted. Indeed, the 
Internet’s popularity as a source of medical information has 
raised concerns about consumers’ willingness to trust and act 
upon health information made available online without 
consulting healthcare professionals.77 These concerns are well 
founded: one study found that about three million adults were 
  
Organizational Responsibility, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 157, 157 (2002) (“Thousands of 
health websites, patient support listserves and health-related advertisement banners 
are readily accessible by Internet users . . . .”); Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical 
Practice in the Cyber Age: Issues and Challenges for State Medical Boards, 26 AM. J. L. 
& MED. 255, 259 (2000) (“[O]ne of the principal reasons people use the Internet is to 
pursue health information.”). Resources such as MEDLINE, a database containing 
references to health science journals, and forums where individuals suffering from 
particular diseases communicate with one another are examples of online venues of 
information. Id. at 259-60. One study reported that “e-caregivers,” individuals who rely 
on information obtained via the Internet to help a loved one with a health problem,  
rely on sources such as “communities of like-minded individuals . . . .” Mary Madden & 
Susannah Fox, Finding Answers Online in Sickness and in Health, PEW INTERNET  
& AM. LIFE PROJECT REPORT (2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Health_ 
Decisions_2006.pdf. 
 71 FOX, supra note 4, at i (“Eighty percent of American internet users, or 
some 113 million adults, have searched for information on at least one of seventeen 
health topics.”). 
 72 Id. at 8 (finding that fifty-three percent of users reported that the health 
information that they obtained online had some impact on their actions, including an 
impact on how such users treated an illness or condition, an impact on diet and 
exercise, and an impact on the user’s decision to consult a doctor). 
 73 Id. at 9. 
 74 Id. at 6. This reliance on information obtained via the Internet has raised 
some concerns in the healthcare community. Id. (“One of the concerns that the medical 
community expresses about online health seekers is whether they are self-diagnosing 
and self-medicating based on the material they find online and without consultation 
with medical experts.”). 
 75 Id. at 11 (noting that very few health websites provide information about 
the source and date of information displayed on their pages).  
 76 Id. at 13. Even if users were concerned about the date and source of 
information, such details are not easily obtained. Id. at 11-12. 
 77 Id. at 6. 
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harmed or knew someone who had been harmed due to 
information obtained from the Internet.78 One example of how 
the Internet provides a venue for inaccurate health information 
is the availability of prescription drugs through websites that 
do not adhere to licensure or prescription laws. Such websites 
have caused concern about protecting the public against 
unlicensed physicians who may not be qualified to diagnose 
patients and prescribe medications for them.79 During the chaos 
of a public health emergency, officials cannot afford to risk 
further confusion caused by unreliable, unofficial websites that 
the public visits. 
C.  Panic Attack: The Need for Controlled Communication 
The fact that the Internet has become a heavily 
accessed source of information combined with the fact that its 
content is not always reliable suggests that it has the potential 
to negatively impact the response to a public health emergency, 
particularly if inaccurate information leads to confusion and 
panic. People undoubtedly panic during health emergencies 
and such panic can inhibit an effective response.80 Some 
  
 78 Id. at 8. 
 79 Silverman, supra note 70, at 261-62, 266 (emphasizing the concern with 
“many interactions which can be conducted on the Internet that are ‘totally distance-
insensitive’ and that raise both significant public protection concerns, and serious 
questions about the ability of individual state medical boards to continue to fulfill their 
police power responsibilities of protecting against unlicensed practitioners of dubious 
quality”) (citing Jay H. Sanders, Future Trends: Telemedicine, 82 FED. BULL. 191, 191 
(1995)). We have also seen the development of cybermedicine, which involves 
physicians diagnosing patients over the Internet. Id. at 265.  
  Some online pharmacies took advantage of public fear and failed to follow 
proper prescription procedures after the anthrax attacks in 2001. Lewin, supra note 69 
(describing a suit that was brought once attorneys general realized the Internet was 
plagued with hoaxes involving drugs and decontamination kits after the anthrax 
attack). Florida and Washington State attorneys general pursued litigation against an 
online pharmacy that prescribed ciproflaxin for the treatment of anthrax without 
speaking with or examining patients and without informing Internet consumers about 
the risks associated with taking the antibiotic. For example, taking ciproflaxin without 
actual exposure to anthrax may render it ineffective in the future. Id. Washington 
attorney general Christine Gregoire spoke of the need to prevent anyone from 
“violat[ing] our laws and threaten[ing] people’s health in order to profit from the fear of 
bioterrorism” (quoted in Lewin, supra note 69). 
 80 See Schneider & McDonald, supra note 48, at 587 (noting that being able to 
quickly understand the risk involved in a particular incident “empowers [the public] to 
make better decisions regarding . . . risks in crises, which in turn reduces anxiety, and 
the economic drains of community bereavement, and infrastructure overload”); see also 
Gostin, supra note 7, at 1167 (“A panicked public will require a much greater force of 
peacekeepers—police or the National Guard, for instance—to maintain order. Building 
the public’s trust through communicating correct and timely information is crucial to 
successful management of any emergency.”). 
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individuals become convinced that they have been exposed to a 
disease even though their risk of exposure may be small.81 As  
a result, hospitals experience a surge of patients, many of  
whom have not been exposed to disease, and often reach their 
capacities.82 On a community level, groups known as “worried 
wells” form, composed of individuals who are not actual victims 
of health-threatening conditions but who nevertheless become 
fearful after an incident.83  
The responses to the 2001 anthrax attack and the 2004 
SARS epidemic illustrate how new technology that allows 
information to spread quickly may contribute to public panic, 
resource depletion, and inefficient emergency response. Our 
nation’s reaction to the anthrax attacks is often cited as a 
primary example of poor communication during a public health 
emergency.84 Although word of the outbreak spread quickly,85 
the public and media did not receive accurate information: 
public health authorities were overwhelmed by phone calls 
  
 81 Schneider & McDonald, supra note 48, at 582. 
 82 Id. (noting that idiopathic symptoms caused people to flock to facilities in 
“Dark Winter,” a simulation of a smallpox attack). Indeed, during the SARS outbreak, 
health care providers worked in the background of “intense scrutiny of a frightened 
media and populace.” Belmont et al., supra note 29, at 507.  
 83 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 233. These “secondary victims” change their 
behavior because they are fearful, not necessarily because they have been exposed to 
disease. Schneider & McDonald, supra note 48, at 586. 
 84 See, e.g., Ahle, supra note 7, at 225 (“The most important information to be 
gleaned from the high-profile anthrax experience is the necessity of clear and effective 
communication.”). There were twenty-two reported cases, ultimately resulting in five 
deaths. Schneider & McDonald, supra note 48, at 587; see also Kemper, supra note 10, 
at 388 (noting that the affected areas included five states and the District of Columbia). 
Despite the small number of people actually infected, over 35,000 people received 
antibiotic prescriptions. Schneider & McDonald, supra note 48, at 587. The “worried 
well” ratio during the scare exceeded 30:1. LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 243; see also 
Maureen Lichtveld et al., Preparedness on the Frontline: What’s Law Got to Do with It?, 
30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 184, 186 (2002) (noting that people in every 
state feared exposure and requested either testing of themselves or of white powder); 
Chess & Clarke, supra note 34, at 1578 (noting that “white powder scares” occurred 
even in non-contaminated areas). The high rate of prescriptions could have been due to 
the fact that, nationwide, forty-six percent of people held the incorrect belief that the 
disease was contagious. Id. Anthrax is not known to be contagious. CDC, Anthrax: 
What You Need to Know, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/pdf/needtoknow.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2008). Nevertheless, concern was warranted because anthrax kills 
eighty-five percent of the people it infects. HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 11, at 8 tbl. 1 
(citing Melissa Hendricks, Rx Against Terror, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Feb. 1999, 
available at http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/0299web/germ2.html#germa). 
 85 News of the scare traveled rapidly, as is evident from the panic in New 
Jersey, which was the state most affected by the attack. Ziskin & Harris, supra note 
12, at 1583 (2007) (identifying New Jersey as “the epicenter of the anthrax outbreak of 
2001”). In less than three weeks, more than seventy percent of New Jersey’s residents 
feared they were in danger of anthrax exposure. Chess & Clarke, supra note 34, at 
1578. 
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from concerned residents,86 and members of the media 
struggled to obtain information, often relying on unofficial 
sources.87 The Internet added to the problem of a panicked and 
misinformed public when, shortly after the outbreak, it was 
infiltrated with advertisements for ciproflaxin, the antibiotic 
used to treat anthrax.88 Some less reputable websites even 
offered anthrax treatment in the form of a drug that was also 
sold for weight control.89  
The response to the SARS outbreak is an even more 
troubling example of poor emergency response. Modern 
technology likely contributed to what one public health official 
identified as the biggest challenge during the SARS scare: the 
fear and panic that spread after the outbreak.90 Response 
management was particularly poor in China.91 The Chinese 
government, concerned about instability, remained silent about 
the outbreak.92 Consequently, government officials were forced 
to rely on the Internet to obtain information.93 Many of the 
updates about the incident were transmitted through chat 
rooms.94 The lack of direct comment from the government 
allowed false information to spread, resulting in chaotic 
  
 86 Chess & Clarke, supra note 34, at 1578. New Jersey’s Department of 
Health and Senior Services received over 6000 phone calls from October 1, 2001 until 
November 30, 2001, while the Center for Disease Control received over 8860 calls 
during the scare. Id.  
 87 WING ET AL., supra note 1, at 717 (“Faced with either poor access to public 
health officials or inadequate information, reporters scanned websites, downloaded 
articles, and attempted to identify experts. Without information from the public health 
authorities, one journalist noted that they had to assemble pieces of the anthrax puzzle 
from a variety of what they hoped would be credible sources.” (quoting Elin Gursky et 
al., Anthrax 2001: Observations on the Medical and Public Health Response, 1 
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 97 (2003))). The Government Accountability Office 
reported that much of the panic and fear could have been diminished had the media 
been better informed throughout the incident. Chess & Clarke, supra note 34, at 1579. 
 88 See supra note 79; see also Diana B. Henriques, Anthrax Drug Is Promoted 
on Web Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at C8; Lewin, supra note 69. 
 89 Henriques, supra note 88. 
 90 Annas, supra note 36, at 336 (citing Stephen Smith, US Allows for SARS 
Quarantines; Health Officials Say None Are Planned Yet, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2003, 
at A2). “SARS . . . appeared in a society equipped with instant global communication 
that made management of people through information much more important than 
management of people through police actions. With the Internet, information now 
spreads like a virus, but much faster.” Id. at 331.  
 91 See Farrell, supra note 63, at 595-96. 
 92 Id. at 581. 
 93 Id. at 582. 
 94 Id. 
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responses in some areas.95 In addition, poor communication 
caused healthcare providers to be exposed to the disease.96 
The reactions to the anthrax and SARS incidents 
demonstrate that authorities must achieve an artful balance by 
communicating clear and consistent information to the public 
without overwhelming media channels with too much infor-
mation and causing panic.97 It is clear after these incidents that 
emergency response protocols must incorporate a plan for 
assuring that the Internet will distribute accurate information 
to citizens rather than add to confusion. This would increase 
the likelihood that public health emergencies are properly 
managed, especially since so many people rely on the Internet 
for information about their health.98 By staying tuned to the 
information shared over the Internet and responding to the 
spread of false information, authorities can prevent individuals 
and worried wells from augmenting the levels of confusion and 
panic during public health emergencies.99 
  
 95 One rumor cautioned that Beijing would be placed under martial law and 
led to a mass exodus of workers and other citizens. Annas, supra note 36, at 332-33. In 
addition, healthcare providers lacked important information and were eventually 
exposed to the disease. See Farrell, supra note 63, at 581-82. 
  While China set a negative example by failing to provide an authoritative 
account of a health emergency, Canada might have been too thorough about 
communicating during the SARS outbreak. Federal, provincial, and local governments 
used both the Internet and a telephone hotline to communicate with the public. MARK 
A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS: A 
REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 57 (2003), available 
at http://louisville.edu/bioethics/public-health/SARS.pdf. But there were too many 
voices speaking at once, which resulted in a lack of cohesive information. Id. Several 
government officials commented on the nature of the outbreak, but they did not always 
deliver consistent information. Id. 
 96  Healthcare providers lacked important information during the SARS 
outbreak and were eventually exposed to the disease. See Farrell, supra note 63, at 
581-82. 
 97 For example, emergency response models should incorporate the social 
influence that “secondary victims” exert after an attack. Schneider & McDonald, supra 
note 48, at 586. 
 98 See supra Part II.B; see also Gostin, supra note 7, at 1167. 
 99 Of course, confusion is a natural consequence of a public health emergency 
and should be expected to impede communication to some extent. Chess & Clarke, 
supra note 34, at 1578. George Annas acknowledges that we are living in a new 
communication era and argues that the rapid spread of information using modern 
technology is essential to combating fear that spreads through the public. Annas, supra 
note 36, at 339 (“The rapid exchange of information, made possible by the Internet and 
an interconnected group of laboratories around the world . . ., [was] critical to 
combating fear with knowledge. Information really does travel faster than even a new 
virus, and managing information is the most important task of modern public health 
officials. People around the world, provided with truthful, reasonable information by 
public health officials, who are interested in both their health and human rights, will 
follow their advice.”). However, Annas does not suggest how to effectively communicate 
coherent, cohesive information to the public. Unless authorities improve communi-
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III.  GOING FORWARD: WHO, WHAT, AND HOW 
New emergency response legislation should include 
steps to prevent or respond to misinformation disseminated 
over the Internet in order to ensure that public health 
authorities are equipped to communicate with the general 
public in the most efficient way possible. Legislators should 
consider several issues in revising emergency response plans to 
account for the Internet’s impact. First, they should clarify the 
role of state and federal governments. Second, they should 
decide on effective and appropriate content for the plans. Third, 
they should be prepared to defend the regulation of information 
dissemination against objections, such as claims that Internet 
regulation infringes personal liberties, violates principles of 
federalism, and conflicts with U.S. policy toward free speech 
over the Internet.  
A. Who Imposes Regulations? 
Legislation that aims to implement a successful 
response plan should clarify the appropriate level of 
government to take the lead in ensuring effective communi-
cation during public health emergencies. As a matter of 
federalism, the power to protect public health and safety rests 
within the states’ police power.100 Therefore, an updated plan 
for responding to public health emergencies should be 
incorporated into state legislation. However, there are benefits 
to involving the federal government in the response plan, 
including more unified protection of citizens101 and much 
  
cation, our nation will likely repeat the chaotic responses that have occurred around 
the world in recent years. 
 100 The police power refers to states’ authority to regulate matters occurring 
within their borders. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (describing the 
police power as “a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member 
of the Union under the Constitution” and which encompasses “all laws that relate to 
matters completely within [a state’s] territory . . .”); WING ET AL., supra note 1, at 59 
(finding that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jacobson established that control over 
public health is within a state’s police powers); Silverman, supra note 70, at 256 
(“Under the police power, states have the authority to pass regulations to protect the 
public health and safety of their citizens.”); Ziskin & Harris, supra note 12, at 1583 
(noting that states have primary responsibility for ensuring the health and safety of 
their citizens, while the federal government merely has influence through the 
Commerce and General Welfare Clauses of the Constitution).  
 101 See Silverman, supra note 70, at 274 (“[T]he lack of uniformity in state 
telemedicine and cybermedicine laws means that there will continue to be wide 
variation in the level of protection available to citizens nationwide.”); see also Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (categorizing the 
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needed support for states from the federal government.102 More 
importantly, legislation that addresses the Internet poses a 
particular challenge because the Internet falls within the realm 
of interstate commerce,103 an area that the Constitution 
delegates to the federal government.104 One possible solution to 
allowing the states to exercise their police power while avoiding 
encroachment on the federal government’s congressionally 
delegated authority to regulate interstate commerce is a 
compromise between state and federal authority. For instance, 
Congress could pass legislation that grants states the authority 
to regulate Internet activity during public health emergencies. 
Congress could also commission the drafting of a model act, 
much like the MSEHPA,105 to serve as a recommendation from 
the federal government to the states as to how to incorporate 
Internet communication into their emergency response 
statutes. 
In addition to clarifying which level of government 
should exercise control during an incident, public health and 
law enforcement authorities should consider involving regula-
tory agencies to assist with the response to a public health 
emergency.106 The response plan should include a list of 
agencies to which public health officials may turn during an 
emergency. For example, the plan could incorporate state 
authorities, such as state attorneys general and departments of 
human services, to assist in the response.107 On the federal 
level, the plan could enlist the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (“FEMA”) to assist with communication. 
FEMA’s involvement would be appropriate since it retains 
responsibility for the Emergency Alert System, a method of 
communicating to the public via broadcast during an 
  
Internet as an area of commerce that requires national regulation to avoid 
inconsistencies among the states); Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]he Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked 
off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that . . . could 
paralyze development of the Internet altogether.”); Ahle, supra note 7, at 228 (noting 
that the federal government has claimed the right to use the Internet to establish a 
national information database in connection to an influenza pandemic).  
 102 Gostin, supra note 7, at 1160-61 (“[T]he federal government must be 
prepared to provide support for state and local governments that may be overwhelmed 
by the sudden drastic increase in public health needs.”). 
 103 See infra Part III.C.2; see also Am. Library Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 173. 
 104 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 105 See supra Part I.A. 
 106 Silverman, supra note 70, at 262. 
 107  Ahle, supra note 7, at 230. 
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emergency.108 Since information concerning drug treatment 
may be among the misleading or confusing information 
available over the Internet during a public health emergency,109 
the Federal Trade Commission, which has the authority  
to regulate drug marketing,110 could play a useful role in 
Internet regulation during a public health crisis by promoting 
awareness of proper treatments for health-threatening 
conditions. 
Perhaps the agency with the most appropriate exper-
ience and authority to regulate is the Federal Communications 
Commission, which is responsible for regulating communi-
cations between states through various means, including wire, 
cable, and telephone transmissions.111 The Joint Advisory 
Commission (“JAC”), a subdivision of the FCC that assists with 
emergency medical and public health care facility communi-
cations,112 may be able to assist with proper information 
dissemination over the Internet.113  
B.  Content of Regulations 
1. Silence Is Far from Golden 
After deciding the roles that state and federal govern-
ments will play, legislators must choose the substantive 
content of the legislation. A good starting point is to learn from 
past responses to public health emergencies. In particular, 
China’s response to the 2004 SARS outbreak, characterized by 
poor communication management, demonstrates methods that 
  
 108 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 140. The Emergency Alert System enables 
the government to use broadcast stations and cable systems to communicate warnings 
to the public and has become the country’s main warning system. Id. Other federal 
agencies that are typically involved in responding to emergencies include the U.S. 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, the CDC, 
and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Id. at 231. 
 109 See supra Part II.C (discussing anthrax drugs available online after the 
2001 anthrax incident). 
 110 See JANINE S. HILLER & RONNIE COHEN, INTERNET LAW & POLICY 96 
(2002). 
 111 Federal Communications Commission, About the FCC, www.fcc.gov/ 
aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
 112 Federal Communications Commission, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, Overview, http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/advisory/jac/ (last visited Mar. 29, 
2008). 
 113 The JAC’s responsibilities would have to be expanded because they are 
currently restricted to assisting communication among different healthcare facilities 
and do not involve furthering communications between public health authorities and 
the public. Id. 
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public health authorities and agencies should avoid.114 The 
Chinese government, fearing a threat to stability, remained 
silent during the SARS outbreak and placed a ban on the 
media, preventing news of the virus from reaching the public.115 
As a result, physicians and government officials were 
uninformed as they responded to the crisis.116 China’s method of 
handling the SARS outbreak demonstrates that withholding 
information from the public is potentially the worst decision a 
government can make and that an informed public is a crucial 
legislative goal for new emergency response legislation.117  
China’s strict regulation of the Internet likely added to 
the stifled communication during the SARS outbreak. China 
regularly engages in a censorship of the Internet that raises 
serious questions about the government overstepping its 
boundaries.118 China has gone to extremes to exercise control 
over the nature of the information that becomes available to 
citizens through cyberspace.119 Internet providers must keep 
records of website content and track subscribers.120 The 
providers are subject to severe sanctions if they fail to comply 
with such requirements.121 On the user side, Internet sub-
  
 114 See supra Part II.C for an overview of China’s response to the SARS 
outbreak; see also LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 133 (“When planning for [a public 
health] agency’s overall response, include communication as a section in the plan. This 
component should describe how you will communicate messages about the emergency 
and who will deliver the message.”). 
 115  See Farrell, supra note 63, at 582; see also supra Part II.C. 
 116 Farrell, supra note 63, at 582. Our nation saw a similar problem during 
the anthrax outbreak: one report found that not all of the data from the outbreak areas 
was shared with the relevant parties. Chess & Clarke, supra note 34, at 1579 (citing 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REOPENING PUBLIC FACILITIES AFTER A BIOLOGICAL 
ATTACK: A DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK (2005), available at http://books.nap.edu/ 
openbook.php?record_id=11324&page=6). Healthcare workers were distressed at 
having to rely on the media for information during the anthrax attacks. Chess & 
Clarke, supra note 34, at 1580 (“This trickle-down form of communication made it more 
difficult to direct staff to exude ‘confidence and competence’ when dealing with 
workers.”).  
 117 Annas, supra note 36, at 329 (arguing in favor of an informed public and 
cautioning that, in the context of a terrorism event, terrorists want to keep potential 
attacks secret, so “the best defense from a potential target is to make this information 
public”). Legislation should direct authorities to relay important messages over the 
Internet as quickly as possible. See LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 135 (explaining that 
officials occasionally report an event when it is too late); Belmont et al., supra note 29, 
at 515. 
 118 See generally Farrell, supra note 63 (evaluating the impact of China’s 
Internet regulations on freedom of expression). 
 119 Id. at 586-87. 
 120 Id. at 586. 
 121 Failure to comply could result in loss of business license and arrest. Id.  
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scribers must register with their local police bureaus.122 
Enforcers known as “cybercops” and “big mamas” patrol the 
Internet looking for offenders, edit blogs, and delete chat room 
dialogue.123 Such an extreme level of regulation is harmful to 
society because it has the potential to create paranoia and self-
censorship for fear of government retaliation.124 Furthermore, 
while China’s extreme restrictions on Internet content can be 
detrimental in any context, they are especially harmful during 
public health emergencies, when clear and efficient communi-
cation is essential. 
2. The Right Way to Spread the Word 
In addition to requiring open communication about 
emergencies to the public so as to avoid China’s blunders 
during the SARS outbreak,125 response plan legislation should 
provide a means of protecting the information that is 
exchanged among authorities and communicated to the public. 
New regulations should prescribe ways to control information 
disseminated via the Internet and should require health 
authorities and agencies to maintain and regularly update 
virus and firewall protections to keep information accurate and 
secure.126 New legislation should also require officials to encrypt 
the messages they send to one another to ensure that the 
correct information is passed from high-level officials down to 
the public.127  
Aside from protecting information, the legislation 
should include methods for efficiently communicating to the 
public via the Internet during a public health emergency. 
Specifically, the legislation should instruct public health 
authorities to establish a mapping program that could be used 
to notify the public about the geographic scope of an emergency 
  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 587. 
 124 Id. at 592. Nevertheless, there are occasions, such as public health 
emergencies, when some regulation and governmental interference are appropriate. Id. 
at 596 (“[I]n times of health crises such as the SARS epidemic the government should 
be afforded some amount of control—at least as is necessary to maintain public 
order.”).  
 125 See supra Part II.C. 
 126 See LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 143 (recommending that computers 
used for communication about disaster-related activities be equipped with “sufficient 
security,” including “firewall, password protection, [and] virus scanning”). 
 127 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 39 (“Encryption is the application of a 
code to a communication in order to hide its message.”). 
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and the availability of resources.128 To increase the chance that 
the public is fully informed in advance of an attack, the 
legislation should require state authorities to create and 
advertise local websites that contain relevant and up-to-date 
information, such as helpful contacts, evacuation procedures, 
and developments in the emergency.129 It should also require 
officials to regularly update any website used to communicate 
information to the public during a public health emergency and 
respond to public perception of an event through that 
website.130  
In addition to creating websites to communicate to the 
public during a public health emergency, authorities must  
be wary of unauthorized websites that convey inaccurate 
information.131 One method of combating this problem is to 
require websites to provide details about their information 
sources and sponsors. For example, the Department of Health 
and Human Services recently announced a plan to encourage 
websites to provide details about website authority and 
credibility, such as the sources of the information provided, 
how the content is updated, the websites’ sponsors, and the 
websites’ purposes.132 A revised response plan should require 
official websites to display a certificate or seal indicating that 
the information provided on the website is accurate, current, 
and trustworthy.133  
In addition to recommending the creation of official 
websites to improve communication between public health 
authorities and citizens, the legislation should advise officials 
on how to use the media to improve, rather than distort, 
  
 128 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 109-10 (“Maps provide a common platform 
for everyone to visualize needed information about the location of events, resources, 
transportation, [and] emergency networks . . . .”). 
 129 Ahle, supra note 7, at 234 (reviewing the failed communications in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina); LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 134 (“Web sites can be 
used for communication to both the press and the public.”). 
 130 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 134. 
 131 Websites can re-establish themselves under different names, even after 
being designated as illegitimate or non-trustworthy: for example, online pharmacies 
cannot be prevented from re-opening under a new website name. Silverman, supra note 
70, at 274. 
 132 FOX, supra note 4, at 12 (noting that the Department of Health and 
Human Services sought to “increase the proportion of health-related websites that 
disclose information that can be used to assess the quality of the site”). 
 133 Such a method has been used for designating particular online pharmacies 
as safe and trustworthy. The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy relies on 
such a seal, which online pharmacies earn if they “maintain all necessary state 
pharmacy licenses, follow all appropriate pharmacy laws and regulations, and pass a 
seventeen point test and a site inspection.” Silverman, supra note 70, at 271-72. 
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communication.134 Considering that many people obtain 
information either directly from the Internet or from active 
Internet users and that the Internet provides so many venues 
for sharing information, the Internet may be one of the best 
ways to use media channels during a response to a public 
health emergency.135 The new response plan should instruct 
authorities to disseminate positive, factual, and clear messages 
through Internet media channels.136 The legislation should also 
require authorities to use the Internet to educate the public 
about safety precautions.137 Active Internet users, known to 
provide information to less-practiced users, would thus 
potentially play a significant role in educating others about 
emergencies over the Internet.138 An educated public could then 
participate in response efforts and provide support for 
healthcare workers and authorities.139 Finally, the legislation 
should require authorities to test the effectiveness of Internet 
communication during times of non-emergency by practicing 
coordinated information releases.140  
While establishing secure Internet sites would increase 
the chance that the public receives accurate information during 
emergencies,141 a more aggressive approach to controlling 
information would be to intercept communications directly by 
restricting certain activities occurring over the Internet. To 
that end, the proposed legislation should grant public health 
officials authority to demand that website administrators 
correct any misleading or false information displayed on their 
websites.  
The Illinois Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and 
Response Plan exemplifies a response plan that incorporates 
the Internet, recognizes the possible role of agencies, and 
  
 134 See LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 156. The media can help issue warnings 
and Public Service Announcements instructing citizens how to protect themselves. Id. 
at 250-51. 
 135 See supra Part II.A-B. 
 136 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 133-34. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See HORRIGAN, supra note 2, at 8 (establishing that people rely on active 
Internet users for news). In fact, the “rumors” that were spread during the SARS 
outbreak in China were accurate pieces of news. Farrell, supra note 63, at 582-83. 
 139 Ahle, supra note 7, at 243; see also Gostin, supra note 7, at 1167 
(suggesting one way for community members to participate is to organize volunteers or 
circulate messages). 
 140 Ahle, supra note 7, at 240 (advocating that a communications plan “be 
tested and practiced prior to a pandemic to ensure that it is effective”). 
 141 LANDESMAN, supra note 40, at 134 (suggesting that websites be used to 
deliver messages to the media and the public during emergencies). 
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provides a clear communication strategy.142 The plan relies on 
state and local websites to provide information to the public.143 
It also enlists the help of several state agencies, including the 
Illinois Department of Human Services and the Office of  
the Attorney General.144 The plan’s communication strategy 
involves educating the media and the public about risks and 
responses during an emergency, conducting drills to assess 
communications, and addressing the needs of specific popu-
lations, such as the disabled, that might have special needs for 
obtaining information.145 Legislators should follow Illinois’s 
example by enacting a comprehensive response plan that 
utilizes modern communication systems and agency expertise.  
C.  Responding to Objections 
Legislation that aims to regulate information dissemi-
nation is sure to raise objections. Aggressive regulation of 
Internet content is particularly controversial because it 
implicates individual liberties, blurs the line between state  
and federal authority, and challenges certain U.S. policy 
objectives. Nevertheless, Internet regulation in the face of a 
public health emergency can be defended against these 
potential objections.  
1. Constitutional Objections 
If states or the federal government adopt regulations 
that restrict information sharing over the Internet, a signifi-
cant concern would be whether such regulations interfere with 
individual liberties. Internet regulatory authority has been 
granted to federal agencies such as the Federal Trade 
Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of 
Export Administration.146 Nevertheless, there is an ongoing 
debate surrounding Internet regulation, weighing public safety 
and security concerns against privacy, free trade, and free 
speech interests.147 Arguments in favor of regulating the 
Internet to protect individual interests, such as shielding 
  
 142  Ahle, supra note 7, at 229-30, 232. 
 143 Id. at 232. The plan also suggests running rumor control hotlines. Id. 
 144 Id. at 230. 
 145 Id. at 232. 
 146  Hiller & Cohen, supra note 110, at 26, 41, 96-98. 
 147 Id. at 25-26, 41-42, 95-98.  
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minors from obscene materials and keeping personal 
identification information secure, have been asserted against 
arguments in favor of an unregulated Internet made by 
industry and political groups.148 
For the most part, the Internet enjoys the same strict 
level of First Amendment protection given to newspapers, 
magazines, and books.149 The Supreme Court has recognized 
the value of protecting website content in the interest of free 
expression.150 This recognition suggests that Internet regulation 
implicates highly valued constitutional rights.151 If the proposed 
legislation is challenged on First Amendment grounds, the 
government should emphasize that individual rights are not 
limitless.152 Under First Amendment law, freedom of speech is 
limited by content because not all forms of speech are 
protected.153 Political speech, or the expression of ideas, receives 
the most protection, while commercial speech, such as adver-
tising, receives less protection.154 Speech that endangers the 
public is not protected by the First Amendment.155 Therefore, 
speech over the Internet that creates chaos and confusion by 
  
 148 See id. at 25-26, 98. 
 149 KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 56, 412 
(5th ed., 2007) (“The Internet is treated more like the print media, with full First 
Amendment protection, not like broadcast media with limited freedoms.”). Censoring  
a news story is only permitted under rare circumstances. Marjorie A. Shields, 
Annotation, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Web Site Operators, 30 A.L.R. 6th 
299, § 2 (2008). 
 150 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (rejecting 
the argument that failure to regulate obscene materials over the Internet will drive 
users away and stunt Internet growth); see also SABLEMAN, supra note 1, at 247 (noting 
that the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision finding the Communications 
Decency Act unconstitutional in part because of how highly society values free 
expression). 
 151 For example, in fighting cybercrime, two constitutional rights that are 
implicated are the First Amendment freedom of speech and the Fourth Amendment 
protection against search and seizure. HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 166. 
 152 WING ET AL., supra note 1, at 664 (“Even speech, perhaps the most closely 
protected constitutional right, can be subject to regulation or even prohibited 
altogether if the government’s purpose is ‘compelling’ and the means for achieving that 
purpose are ‘sufficiently tailored.’ ”).  
 153 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 50.  
 154 Id. Electronic speech, or speech that occurs on the Internet, includes the 
display of words and images, website addresses, domain names, and software code. A 
crucial difference between electronic speech and traditional speech is that millions of 
users around the world have access to the former. Id. at 49. Regardless of this 
distinction, any regulation affecting the expression of an opinion or idea is subject to 
strict scrutiny and will often be found unconstitutional. Id. at 50.  
 155 Id. at 50 (offering the act of “shouting ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater” as an 
example of speech that “presents a clear and present danger”). 
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misinforming the public during an emergency is not entitled to 
First Amendment protection. 
In response to this argument, Internet bloggers and 
other free speech advocates may counter that their speech 
expresses their views about the credibility of public health 
threats or the effectiveness of the government’s response and is 
thus entitled to the constitutional armor typically provided for 
political speech.156 In addition, extreme proponents of this view 
may emphasize the need to preserve individual freedoms even 
if public health is compromised or negatively impacted, arguing 
that to infringe such freedoms is almost never necessary or 
worthwhile.157 
The government should then counter that freedom of 
speech, in addition to being limited by content when the speech 
endangers the public, is limited by the balancing of individual 
and public interests.158 Specifically, the government should 
argue that it is entitled to regulate freedom of speech when 
such regulation will serve a substantial state interest and such 
regulation is no more restrictive than necessary to further that 
interest.159 In other words, the individual right to free speech is 
limited by state interests in protecting public health during an 
emergency.  
Individual liberties are often implicated in public health 
law.160 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
  
 156 See, e.g., Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2007); Planned 
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002); see also HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 50. 
 157 See Annas, supra note 36, at 321. Annas also cautions against treating 
Americans as enemies rather than as people in need of protection: “Ignoring or 
marginalizing human and constitutional rights, and treating Americans themselves as 
suspects or actual enemies, is counterproductive and dangerous in itself . . . .” Id. Some 
experts contend that the public has a right to know the details of a crisis regardless of 
the potential panic that might ensue. Such experts claim that information should only 
be withheld on specific grounds, such as in the event that an undercover official’s 
identity would be revealed and such individual’s safety compromised. Josh Meyer, 
Media Responsibility During a Terrorist Attack, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 581, 585-86 
(2006-2007).  
 158 A regulation furthering substantial governmental interests can trump 
protection of individual freedoms if limits placed on individual freedoms are no more 
restricting than necessary. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 159 Id. (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”). 
 160 For example, the public health interest of protecting a population against 
disease outbreak may outweigh an individual preference to not be vaccinated. See 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
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individual rights are not absolute and must be weighed against 
the need to protect the public.161 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
the Supreme Court explained that liberty may be limited for 
the common good of public safety.162 Public health law has built 
upon this compromise between individual interests and public 
health,163 and the Supreme Court has continued to balance 
individual interests and the common good in more recent cases. 
For example, in Roe v. Wade the Court cited Jacobson for the 
proposition that individual rights are limited by state interests 
in protecting health.164  
In the context of an emergency, it is sometimes 
necessary to regulate speech that puts public safety at risk.165 
Speech that contradicts authorities’ safety messages may 
endanger public welfare by confusing the public or by rousing 
public opposition to necessary, protective measures taken 
during a public health emergency.166 Correcting false informa-
tion and ensuring the dissemination of accurate information  
by monitoring Internet content would further the state interest 
of responding successfully to an emergency and keeping the 
public safe.167 Ensuring that information on the Internet is 
accurate may also improve agencies’ understanding of the crisis 
and their communication with one another.168 It may help 
  
150 (1973) (identifying the state’s interest in ensuring safety of the mother and 
protecting the life of the fetus).  
 161 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29 (“[I]n every well-ordered society charged with the 
duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of 
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to . . . 
restraint . . . as the safety of the general public may demand.”). For an example of a 
state court following suit, see Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Ky. 2002) 
(allowing publication of information on Internet sex offender registries for the purpose 
of protecting the public and noting that “neither the federal nor the state constitution 
prohibited the disclosure of such information when the public health or safety is 
involved”). In 2000, the Kentucky General Assembly also extended its notification 
requirement of sex offenders to include Internet sites that posted the photographs and 
addresses of convicted sex offenders. See Hyatt, 72 S.W.3d at 570.  
 162 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. In Jacobson, the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
allowing the state board of health to require vaccination when the plaintiff failed to 
establish that he was not fit for vaccination. Id. at 36-37. 
 163 WING ET AL., supra note 1, at 59.  
 164 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55. 
 165 See HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 50; see also United States v. 
Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that bodily threats defendant 
made over the Internet were not protected by the First Amendment because they were 
explicit and displayed defendant’s intent to harm others). 
 166 See, e.g., Zieper, 474 F.3d at 70 (granting qualified immunity to federal 
agents who requested a website administrator to remove content that could cause a 
riot). 
 167 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 168 See supra Part III.B. 
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individuals understand how agencies are responding to the 
emergency,169 which in turn would help establish trust in state 
and federal government, a crucial factor to combating chaos 
during an emergency.170 In the context of an infectious disease 
outbreak, consistent information from all media sources would 
educate citizens about what preventive steps to take, which 
would consequently slow or even stop the spread of the 
disease.171  
In addition to highlighting limitations to freedom of 
speech, the government could justify interference with infor-
mation dissemination by arguing that while regulation of 
content itself may be controversial, regulation of the way in 
which it is delivered is permissible.172 Under the proposed 
legislation, speech would only be curtailed within the context  
of a public health emergency. Furthermore, unlike China’s 
actions during the SARS outbreak, the regulations would not 
completely silence websites or Internet factions.173 Instead, 
interference would be minimal, with an aim to clarify or correct 
false or misleading information concerning an emergency.174 
Clarifying information over the Internet is much less 
restrictive than banning websites from sharing information.175  
  
 169 MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 701 (Ctr. for L. & the 
Pub. Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs., Draft, Dec. 21, 2001), available 
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.; see also supra Part I. 
 170 Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological 
Terrorism in the United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and 
Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2716 (2001) (“A well-informed public that 
perceives health officials as knowledgeable and reliable is more likely to voluntarily 
comply with actions recommended to diminish the spread of the disease. Effective 
information dissemination would work to suppress rumors and anxiety and enlist 
community support.”). Providing detailed guidance such as how to behave in the 
aftermath of a public health emergency will ensure much-needed public confidence 
during a time of heightened attention from the media. Id. 
 171 See, e.g., id. (seeking to “inform[] the public through multiple appropriate 
channels of the nature of the infectious disease and the scope of the outbreak, provide[] 
behavioral guidelines to help minimize spread of illness, and convey[] details about 
how to get prompt access to effective treatment”). 
 172 See HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 67. 
 173 See supra Parts II.C, III.B.1. See generally Farrell, supra note 63 
(providing an overview of China’s response to the SARS outbreak and an in-depth 
discussion of China’s Internet regulations). 
 174 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 175 In fact, states should encourage websites to share information about 
emergencies within proper guidelines. After all, the media is frequently the best source 
of information for the authorities working on the problem, and the Internet can be used 
as yet another channel through which the media can disseminate information. See 
supra Part III.B.2; see also Meyer, supra note 157, at 582-83. 
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In addition to defending the legislation against First 
Amendment challenges by arguing that public safety interests 
outweigh individual interests in freedom of speech in the 
context of a public health emergency, the government could 
also use various political tools to ease concerns that the 
legislation may infringe individual freedoms.176 For example, 
the legislation could incorporate procedural due process 
measures177 to gain the public’s trust by demonstrating the 
government’s respect for individual rights.178 Specifically, if 
states impose regulations that restrict websites’ content or 
allow authorities to interfere with the content of such websites, 
such regulations should also provide a process by which the 
site administrator is notified of the purposes of imposed 
restrictions. The regulations should provide an opportunity for 
the site administrator and other interest groups to seek judicial 
review of restrictions placed on the site. The legislation should 
also place constraints on authorities to prevent overreaching 
into the realm of individual liberties.179  
2. Federalism Concerns 
While states can regulate commerce occurring within 
their own territories, they must refrain from interfering with 
the federal government’s domain of interstate commerce.180 The 
Dormant Commerce Clause bars states from regulating inter-
state commerce “even in the absence of preemptive federal 
legislation under the commerce clause.”181 If state regulation of 
the Internet significantly burdens interstate commerce, it 
  
 176 States should make use of “the democratic process, checks and balances, 
clear criteria for decision-making, and judicial procedures designed to control the abuse 
of power by governmental agencies.” Gostin, supra note 7, at 1161. 
 177 Procedural due process provides litigants with notice of the proceedings 
and an opportunity to be heard. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
59 U.S. 272, 280 (1856) (explaining that due process includes “regular allegations, 
opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some settled course of judicial 
proceedings”); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 468 (15th ed. 2004) (“[C]oncepts of notice and hearing have been at the core of due 
process from the beginning.”). 
 178 Gostin, supra note 7, at 1166. 
 179 Id. at 1165 (recommending that “clear criteria” be required for public 
health agencies’ exercise of power). 
 180 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (identifying three 
categories that Congress can regulate when exercising its commerce power: the use of 
channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and 
activities substantially related to interstate commerce); see also HILLER & COHEN, 
supra note 110, at 12.  
 181  SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 177, at 111. See supra Part III.A. 
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would likely be unconstitutional.182 Since almost any regulation 
of the Internet would burden interstate commerce, the power to 
write and enforce Internet regulations can be expected to lie 
within the realm of the federal government’s exclusive juris-
diction.183 Consequently, parties to cases involving Internet 
regulations often assert arguments that the Internet functions 
as a tool for interstate commerce.184 Indeed, courts have found 
that state laws regulating individuals’ communication over the 
Internet violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
because they regulate citizens in several states.185 In American 
Library Association v. Pataki, the Southern District Court of 
New York expressed concern that allowing a New York law to 
control certain Internet communication would unnecessarily 
burden interstate commerce and would result in the state 
controlling acts that were not occurring within its juris-
diction.186 The court opined that regulation of the Internet 
should be delegated to federal control because state regulation 
would subject users to inconsistent laws.187 Nevertheless, other 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of state Internet 
regulations, finding that the burdens they place on interstate 
  
 182 See PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 880, 891 (W.D. Va. 
2001) (statute regulating distribution of obscene materials to minors placed burden on 
interstate commerce because website administrators could not “limit access to online 
materials by geographic location”); Cyberspace Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 
2d 827, 830-31 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that a statute prohibiting dissemination of 
obscene materials to minors exceeded the state’s authority because it attempted to 
regulate commerce occurring beyond its borders); Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. 
Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (New York statute prohibiting Internet users from 
sending explicit images to minors via e-mail unconstitutionally subjected citizens of 
other states to New York law and placed a burden on interstate commerce that 
outweighed the local interest in protecting minors). 
 183 See Am. Library Ass’n., 969 F. Supp. at 173 (“The inescapable conclusion is 
that the Internet represents an instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an 
innovative one; the novelty of the technology should not obscure the fact that 
regulation of the Internet impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations.”). Given 
that the Internet does not have any geographic boundaries, a user’s actions might 
subject that individual to suit in other jurisdictions. See Sableman, supra note 1, at 240 
(giving the example of an Internet advertiser, who may be subject to suit wherever the 
Internet is available). 
 184 HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 12. See Am. Library Ass’n., 969 F. 
Supp. at 161 (plaintiff argued that a prohibition against distributing obscene materials 
violated the Commerce Clause); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 
261 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (businesses accused of sending misleading, unsolicited e-mails 
argued that state regulation of the Internet violated the Commerce Clause). 
 185 Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 (advising that “[r]egulation [of the 
Internet] by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will 
likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations”). 
 186 Id. at 169. 
 187 Id. at 181. 
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commerce are insignificant when viewed in light of the local 
interests that such statutes serve.188 Therefore, if the legislation 
is challenged on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, the 
government should argue that the burden placed on interstate 
commerce is insignificant considering that the legislation 
would only impose regulations in the context of a public health 
emergency and for the purpose of protecting public welfare. 
3. Policy Conflicts 
Yet another objection to restricting Internet content is 
that the United States has demonstrated an unwavering 
commitment to the free flow of information over the Internet.189 
Proposed legislation, such as the Global Internet Freedom  
Act (“GIFA”)190 and the Global Online Freedom Act (“GOFA”),191 
demonstrates our nation’s commitment to maintaining freedom 
of speech over the Internet. The GIFA includes congressional 
findings that protection of speech over the Internet is crucial to 
combating repression and to preserving fundamental rights of 
free societies.192 GOFA findings similarly associate speech over 
the Internet with basic human rights.193 In fact, the United 
States already limits interception of information communicated  
over the Internet through legislation and law enforcement.194 
On the other hand, the goals identified in the National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (“NSSC”) declare that measures 
must be taken to increase the security of the information 
  
 188 See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that a statute furthering a state’s compelling interest in protecting minors 
from obscene materials did not place a significant burden on interstate commerce and 
noting that “[s]tatutes affecting public safety carry a strong presumption of validity”). 
 189 See, e.g., Shields, supra note 149, § 2 (“Freedom of speech and of the press 
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”). 
 190  Global Internet Freedom Act, H.R. 2216, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005), available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h109-2216. 
 191 Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. § 101, available 
at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/110/h/h275.pdf.  
 192 Global Internet Freedom Act § 2.  
 193 Global Online Freedom Act of 2007 § 2 (acknowledging that free speech 
over the Internet is protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 194 For example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits the ability 
to monitor or intercept communications using electronics and requires authorization 
before anyone can intercept or access messages. HILLER & COHEN, supra note 110, at 
95. In addition, law enforcement must obtain subpoenas or warrants in order to search 
either stored or “real-time” electronic information. Id. at 167. 
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communicated over the Internet.195 This strategy suggests that 
the United States is not completely averse to Internet 
regulations that aim to improve public safety.196 
CONCLUSION 
Federal, state, and local public health statutes should 
be revised to reflect the communication capabilities of modern 
society. Unless legislation accounts for the impact of the 
Internet in emergency response plans, efforts to properly 
inform the public and lead an organized response to a public 
health emergency will be incomplete and largely ineffective. 
Emergency response statutes must provide public health 
authorities with specific guidance for handling Internet 
communication. In drafting or reforming emergency response 
statutes, legislators should incorporate plans to combat the 
Internet’s potential for spreading false or misleading infor-
mation that interferes with communication to the public. 
Regulations that acknowledge this threat and provide ways  
to monitor misleading or incorrect online information will  
help avoid confusion, control panic, and yield more efficient 
responses to public health emergencies. Regulations that 
establish specific means of communicating to the public and 
plan for a way to keep information consistent, accurate, 
reliable, and widely available over the Internet will lead to 
greater success in responding to public health emergencies and 
keeping the public safe.  
Laurie N. Stempler† 
  
 195 THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE x (Feb. 2003), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf (stating as one of the goals 
for cybersecurity response to “[i]mprove and enhance public-private information 
sharing involving cyber attacks, threats, and vulnerabilities”). The government has not 
made much progress on the NSSC, and the need to ensure that communications over 
the Internet are reliable remains. Hoar, supra note 68, at 6 (“Although the original 
architecture of the Internet was appropriate for its initial purposes, it lacks the 
necessary integrity for secure commerce and communication.”).  
 196 In fact, the United States would not be alone in embracing some form of 
Internet regulation, for such regulation is widespread despite the fact that it involves 
some curtailment of individual freedoms. See Farrell, supra note 63, at 577 (“Nearly 
every single state, even those with an apparently strong commitment to democratic 
principals and civil liberties, filters or censors access to Internet content in some way.”). 
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